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Discrimination against Foreigners:  
The Wuerttemberg Patent Law  
in Administrative Practice
Sibylle lehmann-haSemeyer and Jochen Streb
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the patent office of the German state 
Wuerttemberg strategically discriminated against foreign inventors by charging 
comparatively high patent fees. We show that this administrative practice was 
driven by fiscal and protectionist motives.
Since the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was added to World Trade Organization (WTO) law 
in 1994, some economists have called into question whether it makes 
sense to push developing countries to introduce strict patent laws 
(Grossman and Lai 2004; Peukert 2017; Auriol, Biancini, and Paillacar 
2019). The main argument is that intellectual property rights primarily 
foster exporters from industrial countries by hampering product piracy. 
Companies from developing countries, on the other hand, are more likely 
to suffer from the introduction of a strict patent law because the enforce-
ment of foreigners’ intellectual property rights keeps them from catching 
up by learning through imitation.
In the nineteenth century, the German state of Wuerttemberg, which 
is today one of the most innovative and prosperous European regions,1 
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was in a very similar situation as today’s developing countries. Being one 
of the founding members of the German Customs Union (Zollverein), 
Wuerttemberg had agreed not to discriminate against inventors from other 
member states in 1842. Thus, Wuerttemberg’s companies seemed to be 
at the mercy of the competition of technologically advanced firms from 
states, such as Prussia or Saxony, and there was a fear that this competi-
tion would hinder the state’s own economic development substantially. 
As the administrative practice of Wuerttemberg demonstrates, however, a 
government’s lip service to the principle of equal treatment does not guar-
antee that the local patent authority really refrains from discriminating 
against foreign patentees. We show that Wuerttemberg decided to break 
codified rules to which the other member states presumably adhered and 
discriminated against foreign inventors by charging comparatively high 
patent fees that led them to waive their patent protection prematurely. 
To identify the fundamental causes of this patent policy, we distinguish 
between strategic economic policy considerations, that is, fiscal and 
protectionist motives, and non-economic influences such as nationalism 
or xenophobia.2 We provide empirical evidence that the patent office of 
Wuerttemberg strategically put at a disadvantage those foreign inven-
tors who lived in the most innovative countries or patented innovation 
that particularly affected the industries that dominated Wuerttemberg’s 
economy at this time. It is outside the scope of this article to evaluate 
whether the Wuerttemberg strategy of discriminating against foreign 
patent holders was successful and accelerated the pace of economic 
development in the state. This would require either a full-fledged coun-
terfactual analysis with many restrictive assumptions or a cross-German 
state panel regression with an extensive set of control variables, which is 
not possible at the current state of data availability.3
THE HISTORY OF PATENT DISCRIMINATION
Following Douglass C. North’s path-breaking contribution, econo-
mists (North and Weingast 1989; North 1990; DeLong and Shleifer 1993; 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001) interpret the establishment of 
2 This approach was inspired by Timmer and Williamson (1998) who analyzed market and 
nonmarket influences of the changes in American immigration policy during the globalization 
backlash. 
3 For an overview of the German patent legislation before 1877, see Donges and Selgert (2019b). 
In another research project, these authors use a new hand-collected patent data set, including all 
patents that were granted in the German states between 1843 and 1877, to determine how those 
states’ different patent laws affected innovation activity before the harmonization of the German 
patent law in 1877 (see Donges and Selgert 2019c).
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inclusive institutions that guarantee free market access, secure prop-
erty rights, and reduce transaction costs as a necessary precondition 
for sustained economic growth. To prove the causal nexus between the 
quality of institutions and economic performance for the German indus-
trialization, Acemoglu et al. (2011) analyze the long-term impact of the 
Napoleon-led French occupation of states in Northwestern and Western 
Germany that came along with radical institutional change such as the 
abolition of guilds and serfdom or the introduction of a civil legal code. 
The authors conclude that the longer a German state was under French 
rule, the more firmly the new inclusive institutions became anchored 
in German society and the higher, therefore, was subsequent economic 
growth. Based on these findings, Donges, Meier, and Silva (2018) try to 
identify the channel through which the institutional reform influenced 
economic development the most. Using data about the distribution of 
valuable patents across German regions after 1877 (Streb, Baten, and 
Yin 2006), they observe that German counties with the longest period 
of French occupation had more than twice as many valuable patents per 
capita than unoccupied German counties that stuck to their traditional 
institutions for some additional time. That is why Donges, Meier, and 
Silva (2018) claim that inclusive institutions are a first-order determinant 
of innovation and, therefore, growth.
Most scholars who emphasize the positive effects of the codification 
of inclusive institutions implicitly assume that the administration will 
enforce them effectively. This is not something to be taken for granted. 
On the one hand, bureaucrats might be unwilling to implement the new 
rules because they still cling to the old ways of misusing their discre-
tionary power for their personal benefit. Selgert (2018) discusses for the 
case of the German state Baden, which had also been under French occu-
pation, how the Grand Duke of Baden established an efficient and uncor-
rupt administration in the decade after Napoleon’s defeat. On the other 
hand, bureaucrats might not be allowed to enforce the new rules because 
their superiors have ordered them to follow instructions that are opposed 
to the official law. A case in point is the principal of national treatment, 
which can be found in every modern patent law, that many patent author-
ities have disobeyed in the past.
To give local firms the opportunity to imitate foreign innovations at 
low cost, less developed countries have always been tempted to discrimi-
nate against foreign inventors from more advanced countries. Antebellum 
America provides a classic example for a country that openly favored 
domestic inventors (Khan 2005, p. 57). Initially, the U.S. Patent Statute 
of 1793 had limited the right to acquire a U.S. patent to American citizens 
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alone. In the following decades, this discriminatory provision was relaxed 
to the extent that foreigners with permanent American residence became 
entitled to apply for U.S. patents too. The Patent Act of 1836 finally 
opened the American patent system to foreign inventors living outside 
the United States; however, they had to pay a significantly higher patent 
fee than domestic inventors. Hard hit above all were the British inventors, 
who had to give $500 for an American patent, while for all other nationa-
lities, a fee of $300 was enough.4 To make it comparatively expensive for 
British inventors to hold an American patent was not without economic 
logic. Since Great Britain was the technologically most advanced country 
of the early nineteenth century, American firms could profit the most from 
selling unprotected British innovations in their large home market.
To what extent a domestic manufacturer profited from patent discrimi-
nation against foreigners depended largely upon the volume of its export 
activities, because any additional profit a firm could get from preferential 
treatment at home could potentially be offset by a decrease in export gains 
that resulted from foreign retaliatory measures (Geng and Saggi 2015, p. 
15). That is why open patent discrimination against foreigners became 
a less attractive policy measure during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, when globalization led to strongly increasing international trade 
flows (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). In an international attempt to 
end the era of patent discrimination, the founding members Belgium, 
Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, 
Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland established the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property in March 1883. The United Kingdom 
joined this agreement in 1884, the Unites States of America in 1887, 
and Germany in 1903 (Seckelmann 2006, pp. 226–28).5 The most impor-
tant outcome of the Paris Convention was the principle of national treat-
ment, which required that each national patent law treated domestic 
and foreign patent applicants equally.6 This rule has been retained until 
today. Notably, article 3 of TRIPS from April 1994 confirms the Paris 
4 American applicants had to pay a fee of only $30.
5 Status April 2018, 177 states have joined the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property.
6 The original Paris Convention was written in French. Article 2 reads: “Les sujets ou citoyens de 
chacun des États contractants jouiront, dans tous les autres États de l’Union, en ce qui concerne les 
brevets d’invention, les dessins ou modèles industriels, les marques de fabrique ou de commerce et 
le nom commercial, des advantages que les lois repectives accordant actuellement ou accorderont 
par la suite aux nationaux. En consequence, ils auront la même protection que ceux-ci et le même 
recours legal contre toute atteinte portée à leurs droits, sous reserve de l’accomplissement de 
formalités et des conditions imposes au nationaux par la legislation intérieure de chaque État.” 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) provides the original version of the Paris 
Convention in the historical archives of its homepage.
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Convention and obliges all member states of the WTO to comply with 
the principle of national treatment.7
This milestone on the way to a global patent law, however, also marks 
the growing resistance against a too early involvement of the developing 
countries whose technological inferiority might get cemented by a strict 
patent law (for a review, see Maskus 2008). The criticism intensified at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century when international pharmaceu-
tical companies took action against South Africa’s attempt to ensure the 
provision of affordable AIDS/HIV medicine through national legislation. 
Even though the pressure on South Africa was dropped, discussion about 
the impact of patent law on economic and social development has not 
ceased since then.
Arguably, national governments decided to give up discriminating 
against foreigners and to join the Paris Convention because they assumed 
that their domestic industries would realize net gains from enjoying 
secure intellectual property rights in their various export markets. Even 
better than a world where everybody adheres to the principle of national 
treatment, however, is a world where everybody except oneself is doing 
so. Because written law could no longer comprise any formal discrimina-
tory clauses, discrimination against foreigners had to manifest itself now 
in informal administrative or juridical procedures that outsiders could 
not easily observe (or prove). Webster, Jensen, and Palangkaraya (2014) 
argue that patent examiners’ task to evaluate the inventiveness or non-
obviousness of a patent application gives them the leeway in decision-
making to prefer domestic inventors. Analyzing the examination practice 
of European and Japanese patent offices between 1990 and 1995, they find 
that domestic inventors are more likely to get a patent grant than foreign 
ones. Mai and Stoyanow (2014) assume that judges favor domestic firms 
in patent litigations. Based on information about the outcomes of all intel-
lectual property rights litigations that took place in Canada between 2007 
and 2010, they calculate that foreign firms face a smaller probability of 
winning the case. Another way to discriminate against foreigners is to 
delay their patent grants to give domestic inventors the time to gain a 
competitive edge by filing many improvements around the original foreign 
patent application (Kotabe 1992). Richter and Streb (2011) demonstrate 
that the German patent authority obviously used this strategy to support 
the domestic machine tool industry in the 1920s when the review period 
for American filers took more than twice as long as for German ones. 
This was not the first case of discriminating against foreigners in the 
history of German patent administration. We will show in the following 
7 https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips-03_e.htm, accessed on 15 June 2018.
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that the patent authority of the Kingdom of Wuerttemberg chose in the 
nineteenth century a less subtle way to prefer local patentees by imposing 
significantly higher patent fees to foreign inventors. We will argue that 
this administrative practice was not easily observable and gave the patent 
authority, therefore, the freedom of action to discourage foreign inventors 
from seeking long-term patent protection in Wuerttemberg. To prove this 
claim, we will first elaborate the patent law of Wuerttemberg and discuss 
the possible reasons why a foreign patentee had to pay higher patent fees 
than a local one. In the second step, we will provide statistical evidence 
to prove the hypothesis that Wuerttemberg’s patent office strategically 
discriminated against foreigners for fiscal and protectionist reasons.
THE PATENT LAW OF WUERTTEMBERG  
AND DETERMINANTS OF THE PATENT FEE
Before 1877, no nationwide patent law existed in Germany. Instead, 
the larger German states had established their own state-specific patent 
laws that differed considerably with respect to the examination procedure 
and the patent fees demanded (Donges and Selgert 2019b). The Prussian 
patent law, which is often referred to as exemplary for the German inno-
vation system of the nineteenth century as a whole, was in fact rather 
the exception. Even if the very low patent fees give the impression that 
the Prussian legislator designed the patent system in a way that provided 
for many the opportunity to get patent protection, Prussian examination 
practice was rather restrictive. The Prussian patent inspectors rejected 
up to 90 percent of the patent applications judging them not to meet 
the requirement of novelty and inventive ingenuity. While the Prussian 
patent law mirrored many characteristics of the American patent law, 
most German middle states, such as Bavaria or Saxony, decided to follow 
the British example and established only a weak examination procedure. 
As a result, patents per capita were much higher in these states than in 
Prussia. In the 1860s, for example, Saxony and Bavaria granted annually 
70 and 20 patents per one million inhabitants, respectively, whereas the 
Prussian number came only to 3.6 (Donges and Selgert 2019b).
Using the Bavarian patent legislation of 1825 as a model (Gehm 2001, 
p. 87; Seckelmann 2006, pp. 100–4), Wuerttemberg introduced its own 
patent rules within the trade act of 1828.8 The legislature especially 
8 See Allgemeine Gewerbe-Ordnung vom 5. Mai 1828, in Regierungs-Blatt für das Königreich 
Württemberg vom Jahr 1828, pp. 237–86. The patent rules can be found under Articles 143–163. 
The revised trade act of 1836 confirmed the patent legislation of 1828. See Articles 141–160 of 
the Revidierte allgemeine Gewerbe-Ordnung vom 5. August 1836, in Regierungsblatt für das 
Königreich Württemberg 1836, pp. 385–434.
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copied the weak Bavarian examination procedure. That is why the patent 
authority of Wuerttemberg refused only about 10 percent of all patent 
applications (Vischer 1875, p. 498), which is in stark contrast to the 
Prussia rejection rate of 90 percent. Notwithstanding the basic similarity 
with the Bavarian patent law, the patent system of Wuerttemberg also 
possessed some rather unique features that allowed for discriminating 
against foreigners. First, privileged access to information about inven-
tions of third parties was provided for locals. In contrast to current prac-
tices, under the patent law of Wuerttemberg, a patentee was generally 
not obliged to publish the description of his9 patent during its life span. 
Residents of Wuerttemberg, however, had the right to see the patent 
description in the last year before a patent finally expired.10 This privi-
lege gave the locals a head start when it came to imitating an innovation 
whose patent protection was lapsing.
Another special feature of the patent law of Wuerttemberg was that 
the same patent fee did not apply to all patents. Instead, the patent 
authority was free to assign to each patent an individual fee that could 
range between 5 and 20 South German guilders (fl) per year.11 In the 
1850s, an artisan from Wuerttemberg earned a daily wage, on average, of 
about 150 pfennigs; 240 pfennigs corresponded to one guilder.12 Thus, a 
local artisan had to work about 11 days to cover the annual fee of about 
seven guilders, which people from Wuerttemberg had to pay, on average. 
Foreign inventors regularly faced a much higher nominal patent fee than 
the residents of Wuerttemberg did. We will show that even inventors who 
resided within the borders of the Zollverein (but not in Wuerttemberg) 
had to pay a patent fee that was three-quarters higher than the average 
patent fee of a resident from Wuerttemberg.13
It can be argued that the members of the patent authority expressed 
their personal aversion of certain foreign countries by setting particu-
larly high patent fees for their inhabitants. In this case, Wuerttemberg’s 
patent policy would have been determined by xenophobia and a certain 
degree of arbitrariness. We consider the alternative that the patent 
9 The use of the possessive pronoun “his” indicates that, in the nineteenth century, male 
inventors held the vast majority of patents. See Khan (2017).
10 See Article 150 of the trade act of 1828.
11 See Article 151 of the trade act of 1828. In most of our cases, the patent authority fixed the 
annual patent fee at 5, 10, 15, or 20 guilders. Patent fees of 6 and 12 guilders appear in a few cases.
12 See Statistisches Landesamt für Baden-Württemberg (1974), p. 20.
13 The German Zollverein was founded in 1834 (Keller and Shiue 2014; Ploeckl 2015). 
Prussia, Hesse-Darmstadt, Kur Hesse, Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, and Saxony were the founding 
members. Baden and Hesse Nassau joined in 1835, Frankfurt/Main in 1836, Brunswick in 1841, 
Luxembourg in 1842, and Hanover and Oldenburg in 1854. Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck as 
well as Holstein, Mecklenburg, and Schleswig remained outside in our period of observation.
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authority pursued strategic economic objectives when discriminating 
against foreigners. We, therefore, start our discussion of determinants by 
looking at how the patent administration itself explained the differences 
in the allocated patent fees. In a self-report, published in 1875, the patent 
authority of Wuerttemberg claimed to have been guided by two major 
principles when fixing patent fees in the last 25 years (Vischer 1875, 
p. 495).
The first principle was based on a fiscal motive. Between 1849 and 
1873, the state of Wuerttemberg took a sum total of 60,000 South German 
guilders from patent fees (Vischer 1875, p. 498), which corresponded to 
an annual average of about 0.2 percent of total government revenue in 
this period (Mauersberg 1988, p. 171). To foster state revenues, the patent 
authority stated to have followed the rule to increase the patent fee with the 
expected profit an inventor would gain from his patent.14 But how could 
the patent administration assess the profitability of an individual patent? 
One possibility was to rely on available information about the innovative 
strength of an inventor’s home country. Following Moser (2005, 2012), 
we assume that contemporary World’s Fairs provided such information. 
The more exhibits a country presented at one of the prominent World’s 
Fairs of the time, the more innovative it might have been in the eyes 
of the Wuerttemberg patent administration. A second way to evaluate a 
patent’s profitability was to take the geographical distance of an inven-
tor’s residence into account. With the help of an empirical gravity model, 
Wolf (2009) has shown that nineteenth-century German states predomi-
nantly traded with their geographical neighbors. That is why inventors 
from neighboring countries probably expected an above-average trade 
volume with Wuerttemberg and, therefore, had a greater willingness to 
pay an extraordinary patent fee in relation to that paid by foreign inven-
tors who lived farther away from Wuerttemberg. Wuerttemberg’s patent 
office might have exploited this fact by charging particularly high fees of 
inventors located in close distance. A third way to identify patentees with 
a high willingness to pay was to distinguish between patents of inven-
tion and patents of introduction. The patent authority awarded patents of 
introduction to persons who introduced an innovation that was already 
successful abroad for the first time in Wuerttemberg. Originally, the 
person who applied for a patent of introduction did not need authoriza-
tion by the original foreign inventor (Dölemeyer 2015, p. 14).15 In 1842, 
14 Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Streb (2016) show that investors at the Berlin stock exchange 
expected a corporation’s profits to correlate positively with its patenting activities.
15 Many less developed countries that tried to catch up used this instrument. For the Spanish 
case, see Sáiz and Pretel (2013).
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however, this rule changed at least with respect to foreign inventors that 
lived in the German Customs Union. Formally accepting the new prin-
ciple of national treatment, Wuerttemberg agreed on granting patents of 
introduction only to those persons who had already patented the inven-
tion in question in another member state of the German Customs Union.16 
In the following years, the original inventor often teamed up with a resi-
dent of Wuerttemberg to apply for a patent of introduction. It is concei-
vable that the patent authority assigned comparatively high patent fees to 
patents of introduction that protected inventions that had already proven 
their usefulness outside of Wuerttemberg.
Nineteenth-century legislators had deliberately introduced patent renewal 
fees in the hope that many patent holders who were not able to profitably 
exploit their patents would give them up early and make the new knowl-
edge that was documented in the patent file publicly usable long before the 
originally assigned patent duration would have elapsed. That is why, in 
patent systems with renewal fees, such as that of Wuerttemberg, profitable 
patents can alternatively be identified by their life span (Schankerman and 
Pakes 1986; Streb, Baten, and Yin 2006). We assume that Wuerttemberg’s 
patent authority inferred from the patent term applied for by an inventor on 
his individual expectations about his intended patent.
The second principle the patent authority of Wuerttemberg alleged to 
follow was motivated by protectionist reasoning and, therefore, only relevant 
for foreign patentees. Vischer (1875) claimed that the patent administration 
set an individual patent fee higher the more a resident of Wuerttemberg had 
to pay to keep a patent in force in the respective foreign inventor’s country 
of origin (ICO). Similar to a trade war involving punitive tariffs, the patent 
authority apparently responded to high foreign patent fees for domestic 
inventors with high domestic patent fees for foreign ones.17 Even though 
Vischer (1875) did not admit it in his report, the members of the patent 
authority might have had very personal protectionist motives to discrimi-
nate against foreign inventors. In Wuerttemberg, the patent authority was 
a sub-committee of the so-called Centralstelle fuer Handel und Gewerbe, 
which was founded to support the ministry of the interior in matters of 
promotion of trade and industry. Although this committee included civil 
servants, the majority of its members were local businessmen who had been 
elected to the post by their peers. Among these, the entrepreneur Ferdinand 
16 See Article 3 of the Gesetz betreffend die Erfindungs- und Einführungspatente vom 29. Juni 
1842, in Regierungsblatt für das Königreich Württemberg vom 8. Juli 1842.
17 Clemens and Williamson (2004) argue that in the nineteenth-century world without 
international coordination raising tariffs to retaliate against an increase in foreign tariffs might 
have been a growth-enhancing activity.
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von Steinbeis stood out; he had dedicated himself to the industrialization of 
Wuerttemberg and headed the Centralstelle between 1856 and 1880.18 The 
local businessmen around Steinbeis might have used their influence to set 
comparatively high patent fees for foreign inventors in order to discourage 
them from acquiring a patent in Wuerttemberg or, if they still did, to keep 
it for a long time. If the local businessmen did follow this strategy, patent 
fees might have been especially high for patents that affected those indus-
tries that dominated the economy of Wuerttemberg.
Such a discriminatory strategy would have been illegal, however, if the 
foreign inventors resided within the borders of the Zollverein because, 
in 1842, Wurttemberg had committed itself by law to treat the inventors 
from the other countries of the Zollverein in the same way as its own 
subjects.19 Whether Wuerttemberg’s patent authority complied with this 
legal principle in administrative practice is an open question that we will 
research in the following sections.
Thus, we consider that Wuerttemberg’s patent authority strategically 
followed fiscal and protectionist motives when discriminating against 
foreign inventors. By fiscal motives, we mean the patent authority’s 
attempt to raise public revenues, and by protectionist motives, its goal to 
facilitate the use of foreign technology by local businessmen. We explore 
fiscal motives by controlling for the number of World’s Fair exhibits of 
a patentee’s country of origin, a patent’s life span, the existence of a 
joint border with Wuerttemberg, and a patent’s status as a patent of intro-
duction. For the possibility of protectionist motives, we will examine 
Wuerttemberg’s industry structure and disparities of the international 
patent fees. The part of systematic excessive patent fees of foreigners, 
which these variables together cannot explain, will be captured by dummy 
variables that distinguish between patentees from other member states of 
the German Customs Union, from German states that did not become 
members of the German Customs Union, and from non-German coun-
tries. These dummies measure unobserved time-invariant determinants 
of discrimination such as political animosities.
18 Ferdinand Steinbeis’ (1807–1893) former career as an entrepreneur reached its peak in 1842 
when he became managing director of the ironworks Stumm in Neunkirchen in the Saar region. 
As the head of the Centralstelle fuer Handel und Gewerbe, Steinbeis is especially credited for 
founding several trade schools. For a re-assessment of his lifetime achievement, see Kollmer-
von-Oheimb-Loup (1998). In the first half of the nineteenth century, quite similar to Steinbeis’ 
activities, Prussian senior official Christian Peter Wilhelm Beuth promoted technology transfer to 
Prussia as part of his industrial policy. See Paulinyi (1992).
19 See Article 2 of the Gesetz betreffend die Erfindungs- und Einführungspatente vom 29. 
Juni 1842, in Regierungsblatt für das Königreich Württemberg vom 8. Juli 1842. On the level 
of the German Customs Union, this rule was a precursor of the principle of national treatment 
established in the Paris Convention of 1883.
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DATA
To find out whether the patent authority of Wuerttemberg determined 
patent fees according to fiscal or protectionist motives, we need infor-
mation about the individual patents.20 An unpublished register compiled 
by Hans Peter Münzenmayer, which is held by the Wirtschaftsarchiv 
Baden-Württemberg, provides details about the 1,141 patents the state of 
Wuerttemberg granted between 1818 and 1868. This information includes 
a patentee’s name and place of residence as well as a patent’s assigned 
and realized life span. Sometimes, a patentee’s occupation is also known. 
Following Donges and Selgert (2019a), we assigned each patent to 1 of 
24 industries (see Tables A3 and A4 in the Online Appendix) for which 
a Zollverein survey of 1861 provides employment data.21 In addition, we 
hand collected data about individual patent fees from the original letters 
patents that are shelved in the Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg. Information 
is available for 723 out of 972 patents that were granted between 1844 
and 1868.22 The availability of information on patent fees dictated the 
starting year of this subperiod.23 In contrast, it was our own decision 
not to consider patents granted after 1868 because the introduction of 
a nationwide patent law in 1877 systematically changed their assigned 
and realized life spans. If we compare the geographical distribution of 
patentees in our restricted sample of 723 patents with the one in the full 
sample, we find that differences are only small (see Table A2 in the 
Online Appendix). The years from 1844 to 1868 cover most of the period 
in which Wuerttemberg had promised not to discriminate against inven-
tors from other member states of the German Customs Union.
Figure 1 shows that patenting activities were rather low until the end 
of the 1830s, stagnated at a slightly higher level in the 1840s and early 
1850s, and began to rise substantially since the late 1850s. This devel-
opment mirrors the economic development of Wuerttemberg whose 
industrialization gained momentum in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.24 Figure 1 also verifies that our subsample of patents from 1844 
to 1868 covers the period of main patenting activities.
20 Kollmer-von-Oheimb-Loup (2016) gives an overview about patenting activities in 
Wuerttemberg between 1818 and 1932.
21 See Deutscher Zollverein (1864). The assignment was made in two steps. First, we allocated 
each patent based on its title to 1 of the 89 technological classes introduced by the Imperial 
Patent Office in 1877. Second, we used the mapping developed by Donges and Selgert (2019a) 
(see online-appendix ehr12703-sup-0001-SuppMat.docx) to match these 89 technological classes 
with the industries listed in the Zollverein survey.
22 The data are published in Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Streb (2020).
23 That is why we cannot analyze how the Wuerttemberg patent administration treated patent 
holders from other member states of the Zollverein before the principle of equal treatment was 
introduced in 1842.
24 See Kollmer-von Oheimb-Loup (2016, pp. 51–56).
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Table 1 demonstrates that, on average, foreign inventors had to 
pay a much higher patent fee than the residents of Wuerttemberg did. 
Surprisingly, foreigners from non-German countries did not bear the 
highest patent fees. Instead, the extra financial burden was especially high 
for patentees who lived in German states that did not become a member 
of the German Customs Union (Zollverein).25 Even inventors who resided 
within the borders of the Zollverein (but not in Wuerttemberg) had to pay 
a patent fee that was about 75 percent higher than the average patent fee 
of a resident from Wuerttemberg.
Figures 2 and 3 show how the distribution of patent holders across 
countries of origin and the origin-related patent fees changed over time. 
In total, we observe inventors from 31 different countries including the 
various independent German states. Two developments are noteworthy. 
First, the share of patent holders from Wuerttemberg fell to about 50 








1820 1830 1840 1850 1860
year
Figure 1
NEWLY GRANTED PATENTS IN WUERTTEMBERG, 1818–1868
Source: Münzenmayer (no date). 
25 We assigned the states that joined the German Customs Union after 1834 to one of the other 
two groups until the date of their entry.
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the Zollverein and from foreign states rose to one-quarter each. Second, 
the average annual patent fee that patent holders both from other states 
of the Zollverein and from foreign states had to pay rose considerably 
in the 1850s, whereas the patent fees remained comparatively low for 
people from Wuerttemberg. Figure 4 presents the country-specific distri-
bution of patent fees for the ten countries where most of the patentees 
resided. Patent fees differed considerably across countries and were espe-
cially high in France, Great Britain, and Saxony. Interestingly enough, 
Figure 4 also shows that inventors from less developed Bavaria had to 
deal with comparatively high patent fees. This observation suggests that 
the patent office of Wuerttemberg indeed assumed that inventors from 
neighboring countries were especially interested to sell their products in 
Wuerttemberg and, therefore, had a higher willingness to pay high fees.
Differences in the average life span of patents were less pronounced 
(see Table 1). Inventors were allowed to suggest the life span of their 
patent, which could be held up to ten years,26 and, according to Gehm 
(2001, p. 157), the patent authority usually accepted their proposals. An 
inventor, however, was not forced to hold his patent until it expired but 
could give it up earlier when keeping it seemed no longer worth the annual 
patent fee. The fact that the ex-ante assigned life span was mostly longer 
than the ex-post realized life span suggests that inventors’ expectations 
about the future profitability of their inventions were often too optimistic. 
table 1
AVERAGE PATENT FEE AND LIFE SPAN OF PATENTS IN WUERTTEMBERG,  
1844–1868
Patentees’ Country  
of Residence Annual Patent Fee Assigned Life Span Realized Life Span
Wuerttemberg 7 fl 6.4 years 4.8 years
German Customs Union 12.4 fl*** 5 years*** 3.6 years***
German states outside the 
Customs Union
16.5 fl*** 6.5 years 4 years
Non-German statesa 13.4 fl*** 4.8 years*** 3.5 years***
Total 9.8 fl 5.8 years 4.2 years
a States that did not become part of the German Empire in 1871.
Note: Asterisks indicate whether the mean values are significantly different from Württemberg. 
Significance levels are ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Source: Own calculations based on patent fees taken from the original letters patents that are 
shelved in the Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg.
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year
Figure 2
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF PATENT HOLDER’S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
Source: Münzenmayer (no date).
Figure 3
AVERAGE ANNUAL PATENT FEE CONDITIONAL  
ON THE PATENT HOLDER’S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
Source: Fees and country of origin were collected from the original letters patents that are shelved 
in the Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Abteilung Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg E 170.
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DISTRIBUTION OF PATENT FEES BY MAJOR COUNTRY
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of patent fees for the ten countries for which we observe 
more than nine patents with information on patent fees. Endpoints extend two-thirds the width 
of a box. The black line indicates the median, and the borders of the black box are the 25 and 
75 quantiles. In the case of Switzerland, 65 percent of the patents had a fee of ten guilders per 
year. Only three patents came with a fee of 5 and only two with a fee of 20 guilders and are, thus, 
considered as outliers. Also note that in contrast to Table 2, Bavaria only covers the patents from 
inventors located in the proper territory of Bavaria. Inventors from Palatinate are excluded here.
Source: Fees and country of origin were collected from the original letters patents that are shelved 
in the Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Abteilung Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg E 170.
Figure 5 illustrates the development of the patents’ assigned and real-
ized average life span over time. We observe a downward trend of the 
average assigned life span in the 1840s and 1850s. At first glance, this 
finding suggests that the patentees learned to form realistic expectations 
with regard to the future economic performance of their inventions. The 
average realized life span, however, dropped even faster, which means 
that even shortened patent terms turned out to be too optimistic.
Assuming that the number of a country’s exhibits at World’s Fairs 
formed the basis for a country’s contemporary reputation as an inno-
vator, we chose the London World’s Fair of 1862 as a representative 
case study. Since 45 percent of the patents in our sample were granted 
before 1862 and the rest in that year or later, the London exhibition 
Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Streb1086
comes closest in time to the median of our time series.27 We counted 
each country’s exhibits listed in the original catalogue of 1862 (Authority 
of Her Majesty’s Commissioners 1862). To test for retaliation, we coll-
ected information about the distribution of international patent fees with 
the help of several sources including Lerner (2000).28 Since we assigned 
each patent to one of the industries listed in the Zollverein survey, we 
can use data from this source to examine whether patent fees increased 
with the employment share of the Wuerttemberg industry that was mostly 
affected by a particular patent. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics from the perspective of an ICO. 
In our period of observation, inventors from Great Britain, for example, 
held 15 patents in Wuerttemberg for which they paid an average annual 
patent fee of about 16 South German guilders (or 7 U.S. dollars). At the 
same time, the annual patent fee for a British patent, which all inventors 
had to pay regardless of their country of origin, came to 153 guilders 
Figure 5
ASSIGNED AND REALIZED LIFE SPAN OF THE PATENTS GRANTED  
IN WUERTTEMBERG
Source: Münzenmayer (no date).
27 Other World’s Fairs took place in our period of observation, namely, London (1851), New 
York (1853), Paris (1855), and again Paris (1867).
28 Some patents were held by several patent holders of different nationalities. In these cases, 
we have selected the highest (max) country-specific patent fees and number of world exhibits.
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table 2




Fee in  
ICO in 
 fl and ($)a
Number of  
Exhibits  
of ICO at  








in fl and ($)a
Number of  
Patents of  
ICO in  
Wuerttemberg  
with Information  
on Fees
Russia incl. Finland 184.5 (77.5) 723 10.8 (4.5) 6
Great Britain 153 (64.3) 5,785 15.7 (6.6) 15
Austria 123 (51.7) 1,411 11.4 (4.5) 13
Belgium 66.7 (28) 815 7.5 (3.2) 2
Netherlands incl.  
 Luxembourg
49 (20.6) 284 10 (4.2) 2
Spain 47.6 (20) 1,132 13.8 (5.8) 4
France 47.6 (20) 3,092 14.8 (6.2) 70
Italy 42.9 (18) 2,107 12 (5) 5
United States 30.8 (13)  
until 1861, 
4.9 (2)  
afterward
131 11.3 (4.7) 8
Bavaria (since 1853)  
 incl. Palatine
12.2 (5.1) 128 13.1 (5.5) 24
Baden 10 (4.2) 92 9.3 (3.9) 30
Wuerttemberg 9.8 (4.1) 195 7 (2.9) 389
Saxony 7.9 (3.3) 199 15 (6.3) 24
Hanover 6.5 (2.7) 83 15 (6.3) 3
Hesse Nassau 7 (2.9) 18 8.8 (3.7) 4
Sweden 6.3 (2.6) 512 10 (4.2) 2
Hesse-Darmstadt 3.9 (1.6) 125 10.6 (4.5) 9
Frankfurt/Main 3 (1.3) 28 14 (5.9) 5
Kur Hesse (Hesse-Kassel) 1.75 (0.7) 18 15 (6.3) 2
Prussia 0.9 (0.4) 1,198 12.7 (5.3) 98
Hamburg 0 (0) 138 15 (7.1) 2
Schleswig 0 (0) 25b 20 (8.4) 1
Switzerland 0 (0) 387 11.4 (4.8) 14
a One South German guilder (fl) equaled 0.42 U.S. dollars ($). b Identified among the Danish exhibits.
Sources: Patent fees and duration: Andersson and Tell (2019, Table 1), Donges and Selgert (2019b, 
Table 1), Lerner (2000, Tables 2 and 3), Nicholas (2011, p. 331), and Sáiz and Amengual (2013, Table 
1). The patent fees of Austria were taken from the Kaiserliches Patent vom 15. August 1852. Because 
of missing information, we excluded Algeria, Brunswick, Oldenburg, Sardinia, and the Vatican State. 
World’s Fair exhibits: Authority of Her Majesty’s Commissioners (1862).
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(or 64 dollars). Table 2 also reveals that Great Britain led the list of the 
most innovative countries in the respect that its inhabitants showed at the 
London World’s Fair 5,785 different exhibits. 
IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
To test whether Wuerttemberg’s patent authority strategically followed 
fiscal and protectionist motives when discriminating against foreign 
inventors, we need to make assumptions about the indicators that contem-
poraries used to identify foreign inventions that were either especially 
suitable for rent extraction or a worthwhile target of domestic imita-
tion efforts. With respect to fiscal motives, we have already suggested 
that Wuerttemberg’s patent authority relied on four different methods 
to estimate foreign patentees’ willingness to pay high patent fees. In 
the following regression models, we measure a country’s reputation as 
an innovator with the number of this country’s exhibits at the London 
World’s Fair of 1862 and interpret a long realized life span of a patent 
as an additional indicator of its comparatively high profitability. In addi-
tion, we introduce two dummy variables. The first one takes the value 
one if an inventor’s country of residence shared a common border with 
Wuerttemberg, and the second becomes one if a patent of introduction 
was granted. 
An important argument against using a patent’s realized life span as an 
indicator for its profitability is that we must assume reverse causality. For 
protectionist reasons, the patent authority might have applied the method 
of high patent fees to persuade foreign patent holders to give up their 
patents prematurely. To deal with this endogeneity problem, we exper-
iment with using the ex-ante assigned life span instead of the ex-post 
realized life span in our regression models. The former variable (which 
normally corresponded to the inventor’s proposal) indicates an inventor’s 
individual expectation about the future profitability of his patent indepen-
dent from the patent fee of which he only became aware when the patent 
authority granted him the patent. Just as important is the fact that when 
the patent authority set the fee, it also did not know the patent’s eventual 
life span but only the period the inventor planned to keep the patent.
For the possibility of protectionist motives, we make use of two indica-
tors. First, we explore whether Wuerttemberg’s patent authority retaliated 
against high patent fees abroad. There is no reason to fear that the patent 
fee that people from Wuerttemberg had to pay abroad was an endoge-
nous variable. The foreign patent systems did not provide for a patent-
specific differentiation of patent fees so that foreign patent authorities 
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lacked the possibility of retaliating against inventors from Wuerttemberg 
when they realized that their own citizens were discriminated against in 
this German state. Second, we have a closer look at patents that had the 
potential to change production in one of Wuerttemberg’s industries that 
employed the most workers. To explore whether an invention that affected 
Wuerttemberg’s most important industries triggered an increase in patent 
fees if the patentee was a foreigner, we interact the employment share of 
the affected industry with a dummy variable that assumes the value one if 
the patentee was a foreigner. In addition, we introduce dummy variables 
that distinguish between patentees from other member states of the German 
Customs Union, from German states that did not become members of the 
German Customs Union, and from non-German countries.
Thus, we estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, in 
which the variables we aim at explaining are the assigned annual patent 
fees. In addition to our main explanatory variables, life span (realized or 
assigned), retaliation fee, World’s Fair exhibits, employment shares per 
industry and dummies for joint borders, patents of introduction, and place 
of origin, we control for year fixed effects, distance to the patent office, 
and overall number of granted patents per year.29 The standard errors are 
clustered by sector.
We suspect that one of the main reasons for the high fees for foreigners 
was to induce them to give up their patents early. To find out whether 
this assumption is true, we also examine the determinants of early patent 
termination. This is done in two ways. First, we apply a logit regres-
sion, in which the dependent variable is equal to one if the assigned life 
span is longer than the realized life span, and zero otherwise. Second, to 
use all the information available, we run OLS regressions in which the 
dependent variable is the difference between the assigned life span and 
the realized life span. The greater this difference, the earlier a patentee 
terminated his patent before its originally determined expiration date. In 
both types of regression, we are especially interested in the interaction 
term between a dummy variable that is equal to one for all inventors from 
outside Wuerttemberg and the patent fee they had to remit.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results in Table 3 are consistent with the argument that 
Wuerttemberg’s patent authority was guided by fiscal objectives when 
calculating patent fees. The assigned patent fee significantly rose with the 
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number of World’s Fair exhibits of an ICO, which implies that the patent 
authority believed that the profitability of an individual invention was 
positively correlated with its home country’s reputation as an innovator. 
According to the estimates, a one-standard-deviation increase in World’s 
Fair exhibits led to a 0.13-standard-deviation change in patent fee. The 
patent fee also rose by a 0.19 standard deviation with a one-standard-
deviation change in the assigned life span. The finding that the coefficient 
of the assigned life span is higher than the coefficient of the realized life 
span supports our assumption that the latter variable is endogenous. We 
also want to stress that a patent of introduction was about two guilders 
per year more expensive than a patent of invention, which corresponds 
to about a 0.4-standard-deviation change of the patent fee. This result 
shows that the patent authority clearly understood that the introduc-
tion of an innovation that had already proven its usefulness outside of 
Wuerttemberg was, on average, more profitable than a local invention 
still awaiting market testing.30
Protectionist motives are also consistent with our findings. In Table 
3, we find significantly higher patent fees in industries with a higher 
Wuerttemberg employment share. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
employment share is estimated to have led to a 0.05-standard-deviation 
change in patent fee. In Table 4, we interact the employment share with a 
dummy variable that assumes the value one if the patentee was a foreigner. 
The positive and significant coefficient of this interaction term proves 
that the increase in patent fees that can be explained with a Wuerttemberg 
industry’s high employment share was primarily directed against foreign 
patentees. In contrast, we did not find any statistical evidence for the 
patent authority’s official claim that it retaliated against high patent fees 
abroad. The effect of a joint border with Wuerttemberg is negative and 
not positive as expected. This finding seems to imply that the patent 
authority preferred inventors from direct neighboring countries. 
Table 3 also shows that even after controlling for various factors 
that measure the patent authority’s fiscal and protectionist motives for 
discrimination against specific patentees, an ICO still explains large parts 
of the variance of patent fees. A German patentee, who lived outside the 
German Customs Union, had to pay a patent fee that was more than eight 
guilders higher than the one a resident of Wuerttemberg had to remit. A 
30 In another model, not presented in Table 3, we tested the idea that an experienced inventor, 
who had successfully applied for other patents in the past or had a network of co-patentees, 
produced patents of a higher quality and was, therefore, charged higher patent fees. The two 
variables “Number of patents by inventor” and “Number of fellow inventors” turned out to be 
insignificant, however. 
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non-German patentee had to pay about six guilders more, and even paten-
tees from within the Zollverein, who were allegedly treated the same as 
locals, faced an excess patent fee of more than five guilders.
Table 5 answers the question of whether comparatively high patent 
fees pushed foreign inventors out of the market of Wuerttemberg. Our 
most intriguing finding is the significant positive coefficient of the inter-
action term between foreign and patent fee in model 6. It suggests that 
patents from outside Wuerttemberg had a shorter realized life span when 
they had to pay higher fees. Foreigners also had a higher probability of 
giving up their patents prematurely (before the assigned time) with high 
patent fees (model 4), although the estimated effect in this case is not 
significant. Moreover, inventors from the countries that excelled with the 
most World’s Fair exhibits generally seemed to face a higher probability 
of giving up their intellectual property rights ahead of time. An increase 
table 4
INTERACTION EFFECT OF VESTED INTEREST AND FOREIGN PATENTEE
Annual Patent Fee (OLS)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign (=1 if inventor 4.987*** 4.987*** 4.746*** 5.351*** 5.351*** 5.121***
 not from Wuerttemberg) (0.500) (0.500) (0.547) (0.432) (0.432) (0.493)
Employment share 0.0322* 0.0322* 0.0116 0.0312** 0.0312** 0.0117
 per industry (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0232) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0177)
Foreign × Employment 0.0399** 0.0379**
 share per industry (0.0176) (0.0144)
Life span (assigned) 0.395*** 0.395*** 0.394***
(0.0618) (0.0618) (0.0614)
Patents per year 0.00236 0.00236 0.00113 0.00536 0.00536 0.00419
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0231)
Patent of introduction 2.186*** 2.186*** 2.158*** 2.506*** 2.506*** 2.478***
(0.516) (0.516) (0.523) (0.508) (0.508) (0.517)
Distance to Stuttgart 0.0421 0.0421 0.0460 0.0962 0.0962 0.0999
(0.144) (0.144) (0.145) (0.146) (0.146) (0.148)
Border with Wuerttemberg –1.803* –1.803* –1.806* –1.732* –1.732* –1.735*
(0.973) (0.973) (0.975) (0.931) (0.931) (0.932)
Patent fees abroad –0.00229 –0.00229 –0.00236 –0.00225 –0.00225 –0.00231
(0.00548) (0.00548) (0.00545) (0.00518) (0.00518) (0.00515)
World’s Fair exhibits 0.000550** 0.000550** 0.000542** 0.000572*** 0.000572*** 0.000565***
(0.000200) (0.000200) (0.000198) (0.000180) (0.000180) (0.000177)
Constant 5.653*** 5.653*** 5.849*** 2.964** 2.964** 3.155**
(0.768) (0.768) (0.751) (1.278) (1.278) (1.236)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 713 713 713 713 713 713
R2 0.478 0.478 0.479 0.508 0.508 0.509
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by sector. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Sources: Authors’ calculations, see the text.
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table 5
DETERMINANTS OF PATENT TERMINATION
Canceled
Difference  
Assigned and  
Realized  
Life Span Canceled
Difference Assigned and 
Realized Life Span
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Logit OLS Logit Logit OLS OLS
Patent fee –0.0263 –0.0320* –0.0261 –0.0547 –0.0275 –0.108***
(0.0242) (0.0183) (0.0234) (0.0380) (0.0177) (0.0331)
All foreign = 1 0.349 –0.00112 0.373 –0.685
 (Württemberg = 0) (0.387) (0.584) (0.352) (0.558)
All foreign × Patent 0.0419 0.121***
 fee (0.0472) (0.0398)
Patent of introduction –0.858*** –0.275* –0.803*** –0.797*** –0.247* –0.234
(0.236) (0.145) (0.206) (0.210) (0.133) (0.138)
World Fair’s exhibits 0.000307*** 0.000202*** 0.000241** 0.000232** 0.000131 0.000111
(9.52e-05) (6.88e-05) (0.000100) (0.000102) (8.36e-05) (8.97e-05)
Patent fees abroad –0.00130 –0.00182 –0.00285 –0.00282 –0.00210 –0.00209
(0.00304) (0.00217) (0.00281) (0.00278) (0.00188) (0.00181)
Distance to Stuttgart –0.00305 –0.0155 –0.0414 –0.0400 –0.0462 –0.0415
(0.0924) (0.0546) (0.0873) (0.0848) (0.0477) (0.0417)
Border to 0.623** 0.478 0.513* 0.540* 0.335 0.430
 Wuerttemberg (0.249) (0.342) (0.276) (0.279) (0.389) (0.400)
Patents per year –0.00927 0.0343 –0.0102 –0.00971 0.0339 0.0352
(0.0191) (0.0412) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0411) (0.0411)
Life span (assigned) 0.168*** 0.424*** 0.171*** 0.178*** 0.430*** 0.449***
(0.0389) (0.0411) (0.0377) (0.0378) (0.0441) (0.0432)
Customs Union 0.337 0.273
 (Zollverein) (0.392) (0.315)
Other German state 0.652 1.644*
(0.685) (0.863)
Non-German state –0.0352 0.117
(0.458) (0.390)
Constant –0.416 –2.687 –0.373 –0.242 –2.726 –2.349
(1.197) (2.755) (1.230) (1.282) (2.751) (2.781)
Year and sector
 dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 704 713 704 704 713 713
R2  0.284   0.280 0.289
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by sector. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Sources: Authors’ calculations, see the text.
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of one standard deviation in World’s Fair exhibits (about 1,113 exhibits) 
raises the difference between assigned and realized life span by about 
three months (0.1 times the standard deviation). This finding again indi-
cates that the desired effect of discrimination did, in fact, occur: Foreign 
inventors were pushed out of patent protection. The lower cancella-
tion rates of patents of introduction supports our assumption that they 
presented on average more useful innovations than patents of invention. 
Everything else equal, patents of introduction are estimated to reduce the 
difference between assigned and realized life span by about 3 months. 
That the probability of cancellation is positively correlated with the assi-
gned life span is a rather mechanical relationship: The longer the assi-
gned life span, the more opportunities a patentee had to cancel his patent 
before the assigned term elapsed.
To support our main argument, we conclude with a thought experi-
ment assuming that the assigned patent fees correctly reflected the value 
of the individual patents. If that were true, the patent authority could have 
only discriminated against foreigners by granting them a comparatively 
shorter patent term. To explore the determinants of the assigned life span, 
we divided the historical patent population into four subgroups according 
to their patent fees. The first subgroup, for example, only contains patents 
with an assigned annual patent fee of 20 guilders. Again, the coefficients 
are estimated with OLS and standard errors are clustered by sector. Table 
6 reveals that given a fixed patent fee, inventors who resided within the 
Zollverein, from other German states, and in non-German states got a 
shorter assigned patent term than inventors from Wuertemberg, meaning 
that their patent protection was weaker. The significantly shorter span 
for inventors from the Zollverein and non-German states is particularly 
striking and is precisely estimated in most patent fee groups. 
DISCUSSION
In the period of patent discrimination analyzed in the preceding 
sections, Wuerttemberg started to catch up to more advanced member 
states of the German Customs Union. The multitude of factors that 
had the potential to foster such a convergence prevents us from estab-
lishing a causal link between patent policy and growth in the context 
of our isolated case study. Various other historical studies that assert 
that a government could ignite industrialization by facilitating the imita-
tion of foreign technology provide indirect support. Eric Schiff (1971), 
for example, argues that Dutch firms profited from the abolition of the 
domestic patent in 1869, which averted foreign inventors from acquiring 
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intellectual property rights in the Netherlands in the following decades 
(until 1912). As a result, Dutch firms could imitate foreign innovations 
freely and without costs. A famous case in point is Gerard Philipps at 
Eindhoven, who started his production of incandescent electrical lamps 
in 1891 without paying any license fees to the original inventor, Thomas 
Alva Edison, who had been able to patent his basic invention in most other 
industrialized European countries. Similarly, Swiss chemical companies 
used the leeway provided by the absence of a Swiss domestic patent law 
by copying the innovative products of their German competitors. When 
international political pressure forced the Swiss government to introduce 
a patent law in 1888, it found an ingenious way to discriminate against 
German chemical firms. The Swiss patent law of 1888 only protected 
table 6
DETERMINANTS OF ASSIGNED LIFE SPAN
Variables
Patent Fee = 20 fl
(1)
Patent Fee = 15 fl
(2)
Patent Fee = 10 fl
(3)
Patent Fee = 5 fl
(4)
Patent of –0.591 0.237 –1.746*** –0.495
 introduction (0.647) (1.139) (0.385) (0.644)
World Fair’s exhibits 2.13e-05 0.000158 5.52e-05 0.000103
(0.000192) (0.000796) (0.000193) (0.000401)
Patent fees abroad 0.00557** 0.0235 0.00367 –0.0131*
(0.00232) (0.0285) (0.00593) (0.00643)
Distance to Stuttgart 0.0534 0.151 –0.145* 0.0715
(0.290) (0.338) (0.0782) (0.0793)
Border with 1.201 –3.354 0.296 –0.327
 Wuerttemberg (1.040) (1.944) (0.515) (0.466)
Employment share –0.00768 –0.0390 0.0255*** –0.0164
 by industry (0.0200) (0.0291) (0.00828) (0.0149)
Patents per year 0.0669*** –0.107*** 0.0192 –0.0880***
(0.0205) (0.0213) (0.0164) (0.00531)
Customs Union –3.129*** –1.345 –2.156*** –1.167***
 (Zollverein) (0.917) (1.518) (0.432) (0.399)
Other German state –2.622** –2.440 –0.517
(1.096) (2.463) (1.762)
Non-German state –3.746*** –4.275** –3.041*** –1.068
(1.265) (1.986) (0.494) (0.974)
(0.0205) (0.0213) (0.0164) (0.00531)
Constant 3.762*** 14.92*** 6.565*** 11.43***
(0.352) (1.223) (0.761) (0.215)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 98 56 275 281
R2 0.372 0.573 0.367 0.159
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by sector. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Sources: Authors’ calculations, see the text.
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inventions that inventors could represent by mechanical models and, 
therefore, effectively excluded chemical inventions from patentability 
furthermore (Schiff 1971, p. 93).
The German entrepreneurs, who complained strongly about this 
Swiss legal trickery, could also have benefitted from inadequate national 
patent protection. Murmann (2003) argues that the absence of a national 
patent law before 1877 enabled German firms to imitate dyes invented 
in England or France. As in the Swiss case, many domestic firms freely 
entered the market and started a fierce price competition that only the 
most cost-effective companies survived. In contrast to this view, Donges 
and Selgert (2019a) consider the possibility that Baden, the western 
neighboring state of Wuerttemberg, fostered growth by treating domestic 
and foreign inventors equally in the mid-nineteenth century. This liberal 
patent practice might have facilitated the access to innovative foreign 
knowledge that domestic firms could get by disassembling imported 
machinery or scrutinizing patent descriptions.
In a broader perspective, discriminating against foreign inventors 
was just one of the many strategies aimed at acquiring superior foreign 
technology. Entrepreneurs from the European continent tried to imitate 
British technology by sending industrial spies (Harris 1998) who worked 
in innovative foreign companies for a while, smuggling out new machines 
or drawings of those machines, and hiring skilled foreign workers whom 
the government had forbidden to emigrate (Henderson 1972, pp. 4–9). 
Sidney Pollard (1981, p. 145 f.) concludes that these imitation strategies 
triggered industrialization throughout Europe. This view is shared by 
Bruland (1998, p. 163), who claims that technology transfer was integral 
to Scandinavian industrialization.
CONCLUSION
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Wuerttemberg was 
catching up to the more industrialized countries and became one of the 
most innovative regions throughout Europe. At the beginning of this 
development stands the reform of the state’s patent law, which gave 
residents of the other member states of the German Customs Union the 
same formal rights as the local inventors. Scholars who like to stress 
the importance of institutions for economic growth might argue that the 
introduction of this particular set of inclusive institutions was an impor-
tant precondition for the subsequent blossoming of innovative economic 
sectors, such as machine building or car manufacturing, in Wuerttemberg. 
Formal rules can be misleading, however. What often matters more is the 
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hidden agenda of the public administration that is responsible for enfor-
cing these rules. We have shown in this article that the patent authority 
of Wuerttemberg, whose majority were local businessmen, discriminated 
strategically against foreign inventors from industrialized countries by 
charging comparatively high patent fees. This patent policy was driven 
by fiscal and protectionist motives. To generate revenues, the patent 
authority raised patent fees for inventions whose profitability was indi-
cated by their assigned life span, the number of World’s Fair exhibits of 
an ICO, and the status as patent of introduction. For protectionist reasons, 
patent fees were set higher when foreign patents affected industries with 
a high employment share in Wuerttemberg. As a probably desired side 
effect, this unequal treatment led foreigners to give up their patents 
prematurely.
If these discriminatory measures enabled local firms to imitate foreign 
technology faster than under truly fair conditions, the extractive use of 
formally inclusive institutions might have fostered economic develop-
ment in Wuerttemberg. This tentative conclusion is in line with the argu-
ment by Boldrin and Levine (2008), who assume that the strict compli-
ance to the international rules of law with respect to intellectual property 
rights will decelerate the speed of technological and economic progress 
in developing countries’ domestic industry. 
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